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On January 30, 2007, after five years of development and a budget
of over $6 billion, the Microsoft Corporation released Windows Vista to
the public.' Windows Vista is the latest edition of the Windows operating
system for personal computers (PCs). Windows accounts for thirty per-
cent of Microsoft's $44 billion in sales and sixty percent of its operating
profit . Estimates show that $70 billion in products and services revolv-
ing around Windows Vista will be sold in 2007 alone,3 and that Windows
Vista will be installed on more than half of the world's consumer PCs by
late 2008. 4 Steven A. Ballmer, the company's chief executive, called
Vista "the biggest product launch in Microsoft's history."'5
However, accusations of antitrust violations have surrounded Micro-
soft and its new operating system. Currently, more than ninety percent of
* J.D., expected May 2008, the University of Michigan Law School. I would like to
thank Michelle Sharpe for her editing contributions.
1. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Vista is Ready for Consumers but Businesses Key, WASH-
INGTON POST, Jan. 29, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/01/29/AR2007012900498.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
2. Id.
3. Steve Lohr, First the Wait for Microsoft Vista; Now the Marketing Barrage, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at CI.
4. Wakabayashi, supra note 1.
5. Lohr, supra note 3.
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the world's PCs operate under Windows.6 To cement its market power,
Microsoft has engaged in controversial business practices. Those prac-
tices have led to adverse antitrust decisions in the United States, the
European Union (EU), and South Korea. Many of these decisions, both
judicial and administrative, revolve around Microsoft's bundling, or "ty-
ing," of certain subsidiary applications with the Windows operating
system, including Internet Explorer and Windows Media Player. In doing
so, Microsoft arguably gains a greater than deserved market share with
these bundled applications, inhibiting fair competition in the software
marketplace. The United States, EU and South Korean antitrust deci-
sions addressing this tying of software have each produced different
outcomes in their respective jurisdictions.
This Note analyzes Microsoft's newest operating system, Windows
Vista, by focusing on the tying aspect of antitrust law using the prece-
dent set by those three jurisdictions. Part I discusses the recent Microsoft
antitrust litigation and settlement in the United States, the European
Commission's ruling against Microsoft in the EU and the Korea Fair
Trade Commission's decision against Microsoft in South Korea. Part II
explains why South Korea took the most appropriate approach to open-
ing competition for non-Microsoft applications, a method compatible
with current U.S. law governing antitrust tying arrangements under the
Sherman Act. Part HI examines Windows Vista and its multitude of tied
or bundled applications, concluding that a South Korean-type approach




Operating systems serve as the backbone of personal computers. An
operating system provides a graphical interface for user interaction with
the PC, and it performs such tasks as allocating computer memory and
controlling input and output peripherals.7 Operating systems also func-
tion as platforms for software applications.8 Given that Microsoft
Windows has enjoyed a near-monopoly in the operating system market
since the early-to-mid 1990s, the vast majority of software applications
are specifically designed to work with Windows.
6. Id.
7. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
8. Id.
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Microsoft also bundles various software applications with its operat-
ing system, such as the Internet Explorer web browser and Windows
Media Player. The bundling of this software with Windows quickly in-
vokes accusations of antitrust violations. Accusers claim that Microsoft's
practices raise entry barriers to certain software markets, restricting free
competition and impeding consumer welfare. Because of this and other
allegedly anticompetitive business practices, Microsoft has faced anti-
trust lawsuits and sanctions in the United States, the EU and South
Korea.
B. United States v. Microsoft
In 1998, the United States, nineteen individual states, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia brought consolidated civil enforcement actions against
Microsoft under the Sherman Antitrust Act.9 The plaintiffs identified four
distinct violations of the Sherman Act, one being a tying arrangement of
unlawfully bundling the Internet Explorer Web browser software appli-
cation with the Windows 95 and Windows 98 PC operating systems in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. A tying arrangement is "an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees
that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier."'0 A tying
arrangement violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act if "the seller has 'ap-
preciable economic power' in the tying product market and if the
arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied mar-
ket."" The plaintiffs also charged Microsoft with violating various state
antitrust laws. 
2
In 2000, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found
that Microsoft violated the Sherman Act by illegally tying its operating
system and Internet Explorer, among other federal antitrust violations.
The District Court also concluded that its ruling on those federal law
claims "satisfie[d] the elements of analogous causes of action arising
under the laws of each particular state."'3 Microsoft immediately ap-
pealed.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit disagreed with the lower court's use of a "per se" rule for the
9. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000).
10. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992), (citing North-
em Pacific R. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)).
11. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 462 (citing Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
12. Microsoft, 87 F.Supp.2d at 35.
13. Id.
Spring 20071
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tying of an operating system and a software application.' 4 The Court of
Appeals instead decided that the lower court should analyze a software
bundling case under the far more flexible rule of reason.'5 According to
the court, this rule of reason "more freely permits consideration of the
benefits of bundling in software markets, particularly those for [operat-
ing systems], and a balancing of these benefits against the costs to
consumers whose ability to make direct price/quality tradeoffs in the tied
market may have been impaired."'6 The Court of Appeals then remanded
the case to the District Court to reconsider, among other issues, the tying
inquiry under the rule of reason.
7
However, before the District Court could rule on remand, the United
States, Microsoft, and 9 of the 20 state plaintiffs agreed to a proposed
settlement. 8 District Court Judge Kollar-Kotelly delivered a judgment
which essentially adopted this settlement, and rejected the other states'
proposed remedies.' 9 However, this settlement did not include a remedy
for the tying claim.20 Since the tying claim was not pursued on remand,
there was no finding of liability on which to base the remedy.2' In 2004,
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the District Court's
judgment in its entirety.2
Among the many restrictions of the settlement, Microsoft was pro-
hibited from restricting a PC original equipment manufacturer from
installing and promoting third-party applications.23 Yet the settlement did
not force Microsoft to remove any of its applications from Windows. 24
C. European Union
On March 24, 2004, the European Commission (the executive body
of the EU) ruled that the inclusion of Windows Media Player with Win-
dows violated the antitrust provisions of Article 82 of the EC Treaty.25
14. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 84.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 94.
17. Id.
18. Andrew Chin, Decoding Microsoft: A First Principles Approach, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1, 65 (2005).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 73.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 76.
23. Final Judgment at 3, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D.D.C.
Nov. 12, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2007).
24. Chin, supra note 18, at 74.
25. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 82, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 1,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce32 1/ce32120061229en00010331 .pdf
(last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
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Even though the U.S. settlement provided that Microsoft should allow
computer manufacturers and consumers to enable or remove end-user
access to Microsoft applications, the Commission found this remedy
insufficient and ordered Microsoft to market a version of Windows that
did not include Windows Media Player. 6 The Commission also found
antitrust violations under Microsoft's work group server operating sys-
tems27 (this Note does not discuss the server versions of Windows, which
are different from the Windows operating systems for PCs).
In total, the Commission forced Microsoft to pay a fine of over 497
million Euros (about $613 million).28 Microsoft is currently appealing
the decision before the EU Court of First Instance in Luxembourg.29 Bo
Vesterdorf, the president of the EU Court of First Instance, hopes to is-
sue a ruling on Microsoft's appeal by the time he leaves office in
September 2007.30
D. South Korea
In December 2005, the Korea Fair Trade Commission fined Micro-
soft 33 billion Won (approximately $32 million) for abuse of its
Article 82 of the EC Treaty states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading par-
ties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
26. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of 24.03.04
relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Micro-
soft), 2004 O.J. (C900), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commL/competition/antitrust/cases/
decisions/37792/en.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Commission Decision].
27. CNET Staff, EU's statement on end of Microsoft investigation, CNET NEWS.COM,
March 24, 2004, http://news.com.comVEUs+statement+on+end+of+Microsoft+investigation/
2100-1014_3-5178465.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
28. Associated Press, EU Microsoft judge: ruling by September, BOSTON HERALD, Feb.
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market-dominant position.3 ' The Commission ruled that Microsoft had
violated South Korea's Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act by
bundling Windows Media Player and Windows Messenger with Win-
dows.32 The ruling pointed to Microsoft's large gain in market share once
both media player and instant messaging software were bundled with
Windows; the ruling also acknowledged that Microsoft's market share
gain translated into a large market share drop for competing software.33
South Korea then went further than either the United States or the
EU. In addition to the fine, the Korea Fair Trade Commission ordered
Microsoft to market two versions of Windows. The first version would
be stripped of Windows Media Player and Windows Messenger, while
the second version would include both software applications, but would
also direct users to Web pages where they could download competing
software."
PART II
Microsoft claims that its bundled versions of Windows benefit both
consumers and the technology industry.33 The company argues that the
bundled versions do not block competition because software developers
can successfully distribute their software to end users, and these end us-
ers can easily choose to install and utilize that software.36 However,
despite Microsoft's assurances, significant barriers exist for software
applications that wish to integrate into Windows.
When a software company decides to create a web browser, media
player, or other software application, it must expend a large amount of
capital attempting to compete with existing software, including Micro-
soft's software. A large software company can conceivably do this.
However, since Microsoft bundles its software with Windows, the vast
majority of personal computers already include Microsoft software. Any
31. The findings of the Korea Fair Trade Commission can be found at
http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/micorsoft case.pdf. See also Aaron Tan, South Korea fines Microsoft
$32 Million, ZDNET, Dec. 7, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-5985332.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2007).
32. Id. The Commission also found a violation for Microsoft bundling Windows Media
Service with server versions of Windows, Id.
33. id.
34. Id.
35. CBS/AP, Microsoft-EU Antitrust Talks Fail, CBS NEWS, March 18, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.coml/stories/2003/09/26/tech/main575412.shtml (last visited Feb. 16,
2007).
36. Press Release from Microsoft, Microsoft Submits Proposed Findings of Fact, Aug.
10, 1999, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/1999/08-10findings.mspx (last visited
Feb. 14, 2007).
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company that wishes to compete with Microsoft faces a seemingly end-
less uphill battle to claim any remaining market share from the
Windows-bundled applications. Entry barriers result for these software
companies.
For example, in the EU ruling, the European Commission found
tremendous growth in Windows Media Player market share once it was
included in Windows.37 In October 1999, immediately before Microsoft
began including Windows Media Player with its operating system, 50%
of users reported that the media player they used most often was Real-
Networks' RealPlayer.8 By August 2003 this figure had fallen to 19%.'9
In that same period Windows Media Player's share increased signifi-
cantly from 22% to 45%.40 The EU further found that tying Windows
Media Player to Windows discouraged computer manufacturers from
shipping personal computers with non-Microsoft media players pre-
installed. In fact, RealNetworks had to pay computer manufacturers to
preinstall its software in order to promote product usage.
South Korea's decision, more so than the U.S. settlement and the EU
ruling, will assist companies like RealNetworks. By forcing Microsoft to
provide the two versions of Windows, South Korea removes some of the
competition barriers created by Microsoft's bundling. In addition, even
the versions of Windows that include bundled Microsoft applications
point users to online lists of competing software, allowing consumers to
make an informed decision as to choice of application. As more competi-
tors enter the market, Microsoft will have a stronger incentive to produce
better software applications to encourage Windows users to choose Mi-
crosoft's application over the competitors' application.
On the other hand, the U.S. solution has proven untenable. As a re-
sult of the U.S. settlement and judgment, Microsoft must allow computer
manufacturers to remove default access to Microsoft applications and
install third-party programs as the default program. However, the Micro-
soft application remains installed on the computer, immediately available
to the user. Even more problematic, few computer manufacturers have
chosen to change the default applications, realizing that consumers are
less likely to buy computers if they are unfamiliar with the default soft-
ware.
37. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of 24.03.04
relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Micro-
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Some claim that remedies such as those adopted by the EU and
South Korea impose significant costs on consumers without any incre-
mental competitive benefit.4' Others argue that non-Microsoft software
developers need Microsoft's software interfaces (known as APIs) into
Windows to better create Windows-compatible applications.42
However, the EU case demonstrates that Microsoft could remove the
tied software while allowing the APIs to remain. The EU instructed Mi-
crosoft to remove Windows Media Player from Microsoft Windows but
allowed Microsoft to keep the APIs for other applications to use. The
European Commission specifically requested that no reduction in per-
formance should result. Microsoft then successfully distributed an
alternative version of Windows for the EU market place, known as Win-
dows XP N (and later Windows Vista N) which did not include Windows
Media Player. If Microsoft successfully achieved this with Windows
Media Player, then it should be able to do the same with other applica-
tions, given its strong supply of developers, engineers, and resources.
Despite the South Korean approach, recent domestic developments
suggest that the settlement between the U.S. government and Microsoft
will remain. According to J. Bruce McDonald, deputy assistant attorney
general in the Justice Department's antitrust division, the South Korean
remedy "goes beyond what is necessary or appropriate to protect con-
sumers, as it requires the removal of products that consumers may
prefer."43 Moreover, in late 2006, the United States v. Microsoft plaintiffs
and Microsoft issued a joint status report on Microsoft's compliance
with the final judgments, as required under the settlement.' The report
stated that Windows Vista satisfied the terms of the settlement and did
not appear to raise antitrust concerns.45 However, the District Court never
made a final decision on the tying claim under the Sherman Act as the
settlement occurred before the court could rule on remand. If the litiga-
tion were to return to court with Windows Vista at the center of the
controversy, the outcome could mimic the original District Court deci-
41. David S. Evans, Albert L. Nichols, & Richard Schmalensee, United States v. Micro-
soft: Did Consumers Win? 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 497, 501 (2005).
42. Written Direct Testimony of Christopher Jones, N.Y. v. Microsoft, No. 98-1233
(D.C.C. April 25, 2002), http://www.microsoft.com/presspasslegal/jones.mspx (last visited
Mar. 7, 2007).
43. Declan McCullagh, Feds side with Microsoft in Korea flap, ZDNET, Dec. 7, 2005,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-5985912.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
44. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2l9800/219800.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
45. Id. See also Anne Broache, Justice Dept.: Vista satisfies antitrust deal, CNET
NEWS.COM, Nov. 21, 2006, http://news.com.com/Justice+Dept.+Vista+satisfies+antitrust+deal/
2100-10163-6137603.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
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sion with the court ruling that the tying of software applications to the
operating system would violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
PART III
Microsoft included numerous new applications with Windows Vista.
All editions are bundled with Internet Explorer 7, Windows Media
Player 11, Windows Mail e-mail client, Windows Calendar, Windows
Photo Gallery, Windows Sync Center for mobile devices, Windows Mo-
bility Center for presentations on the road, Windows Security Center,
Windows Meeting Space for ad hoc wireless meetings, and Remote
Desktop for working from home. ' Not only is each of these applications
bundled with the operating system, each is preferred by the operating
system. A CNET review of Windows Vista stated that "the extensive tie-
ins to Microsoft.com and Live.com, and the many, many interdepend-
ences upon Internet Explorer 7 left us desperately wanting more (and
often best-of-breed) alternatives."47 For example, CNET found that RSS
feeds from Internet Explorer 7 get preferential treatment, even though
many users prefer to use Firefox or other web browsers.48
In a new civil action against Windows Vista, a court could use the
rule of reason under antitrust law, with guidance from the EU decision
and the South Korean decision, and find that Microsoft's bundling vio-
lates the Sherman Act's prohibition against tying arrangements. The
court would then have to decide which applications to unbundle from
Windows Vista. For example, the Microsoft Court of Appeals greatly
emphasized Internet Explorer's integration into Windows, stating that
this integration needed to remain to appease third party developers. 49 Mi-
crosoft applications such as Internet Explorer could not be easily
removed without breaking the interdependencies and thus should not be
unbundled. °
However, when the EU instructed Microsoft to remove Windows Me-
dia Player from Microsoft Windows, it allowed Microsoft to keep the APIs
used by Windows Media Player for other applications to use, thus not
breaking any interdepenancies.5' The European Commission specifically
46. Robert Vamosi, Microsoft Vista Home Basic, CNET, Jan. 24, 2007, http:// re-




49. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 93-94.
50. Id.
51. Commission Decision, supra note 26.
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requested that no reduction in performance should occur.12 Microsoft
then successfully distributed Windows XP N and Windows Vista N for
the EU marketplace, neither of which includes Windows Media Player.53
The U.S. plaintiffs could argue that since Microsoft successfully sepa-
rated Windows Media Player from Windows Vista in Europe, Microsoft
could achieve the same result with American versions of Windows Me-
dia Player and other Windows Vista applications.
An unbundling of Windows Vista would help Microsoft's competi-
tion, but would it help consumers?- Many Windows users would finally
be introduced to the viable alternatives to Microsoft applications that
exist, such as Firefox for Internet Explorer and iTunes for Windows Me-
dia Player. There are a host of substitutes for the other applications that
Microsoft currently includes in Windows Vista. Most importantly, Mi-
crosoft has already carried out an untying remedy in the EU and South
Korea, proving that it can be done. Furthermore, any consumer who de-
sired the Microsoft versions of the Windows Vista applications could
simply download or purchase them in the same way other software is
acquired.
U.S. implementation of the South Korean remedy would force Mi-
crosoft to market two versions of every version of Windows Vista. One
version of Vista could have Microsoft applications absent, but include a
web page link or similar information page with a list of Microsoft soft-
ware options available for download. The second version of Vista could
include all the installed Microsoft applications, but would more promi-
nently display the alternatives available to the user, as quickly as
possible after first use. The South Korean solution aligns with the origi-
nal District Court decision, encourages greater competition and
innovation, and as the next plaintiffs should argue, is an antitrust remedy
not unduly burdensome for Microsoft.
CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty years, Microsoft has successfully executed a
marketing plan that centered on quickly eliminating any real PC operat-
ing system competition. At the same time, Microsoft slowly occupied the
52. Id.
53. Ina Fried, Microsoft to Rename Media-Player-Less Windows, CNET NEWS.COM,
March 28, 2005, http://news.com.com/Microsoft+to+rename+media-player-less+Windows/
2100-10143-5643117.html (last visited March 26, 2007).; Ina Fried, Microsoft Boxes Up
Vista, Feb. 26, 2006, CNET NEWS.COM, http://news.com.com/Microsoft+boxes+up+Vista+-
+page+2/2100-1016_3-6043222-2.htmltag=st.num (last visited March 26, 2007).
54. See Evans, supra note 41, at 499-500.
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field in application software compatible with its operating system, such
as internet browsers, media players, and instant messenger services.
The U.S. solution to Microsoft's business practices has resulted in a
complete union of operating system and application software. Further-
more, it has created an artificial limitation on the computer
manufacturers who now lack the ability to give their customers a choice
in application software. By effectively requiring that each user of the
operating system have Microsoft applications installed, Windows Vista
continues Microsoft's well-known monopolistic approach by reducing
competition, raising entry barriers, and inhibiting consumer choice.
In contrast, the South Korean solution to Microsoft's business prac-
tices solves many market share issues by forcing Microsoft to develop
two versions of its software, and informing users of the choice in soft-
ware that they have. This Note has argued that the United States should
follow South Korea's example if a Windows Vista antitrust lawsuit were
to occur (despite the current terms of the United States v. Microsoft set-
tlement). If given a meaningful choice, consumers would finally reclaim
control of the software marketplace from the hands of the Microsoft and
Windows Vista.
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